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In principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers unconditional security based on the laws
of physics. In practice, flaws in the state preparation undermine the security of QKD systems,
as standard theoretical approaches to deal with state preparation flaws are not loss-tolerant. An
eavesdropper can enhance and exploit such imperfections through quantum channel loss, thus dra-
matically lowering the key generation rate. Crucially, the security analyses of most existing QKD
experiments are rather unrealistic as they typically neglect this effect. Here, we propose a novel and
general approach that makes QKD loss-tolerant to state preparation flaws. Importantly, it suggests
that the state preparation process in QKD can be significantly less precise than initially thought.
Our method can widely apply to other quantum cryptographic protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a
Introduction.— Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1]
allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to distribute
a secret key, which is essential to achieve provable secure
communications [2]. The field of QKD has progressed
very rapidly over the last years, and it now offers practical
systems that can operate in realistic environments [3, 4].
Crucially, QKD provides unconditional security based
on the laws of physics, i.e., despite the computational
power of the eavesdropper, Eve. Indeed, the security of
QKD has been promptly demonstrated for different sce-
narios [5–12]. Importantly, Gottesman, Lo, Lu¨tkenhaus
and Preskill [13] (henceforth referred to as GLLP) proved
the security of QKD when Alice’s and Bob’s devices
are flawed, as is the case in practical implementations.
Unfortunately, however, GLLP has a severe limitation,
namely, it is not loss-tolerant; it assumes the worst case
scenario where Eve can enhance flaws in the state prepa-
ration by exploiting channel loss. As a result, the key
generation rate and achievable distance of QKD are dra-
matically reduced [14]. Notice that most existing QKD
experiments simply ignore state preparation imperfec-
tions in their key rate formula, which renders their results
unrealistic and not really secure.
In this Letter, we show that GLLP’s worst case as-
sumption is far too conservative, i.e., in sharp contrast
to GLLP, we present a security proof for QKD that is
loss-tolerant. Indeed, for the case of modulation errors,
an important flaw in real-life QKD systems, we show that
Eve cannot exploit channel loss to enhance such imper-
fections. The intuition here is rather simple: in this type
of state preparation flaws the signals sent out by Alice are
still qubits, i.e., there is no side-channel for Eve to exploit
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to enhance the imperfections through channel loss.
Our work builds on the security proof introduced by
Koashi [12] based on complementarity of conjugate ob-
servables, X and Z. Also, it employs the idea of “rejected
data analysis” [15], i.e., we consider data obtained when
Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases are different, as well
as the fact that any qubit state can be written in terms
of Pauli matrices. Therefore, to calculate the objective
quantity, i.e., the so-called phase error rate, it is enough
to find the transmission rates of these matrices.
In so doing, we can: (i) dramatically improve the key
rate and achievable distance of QKD with modulation
errors (see Fig. 1 for details); (ii) show that the three-
state scheme [16, 17] gives precisely the same key rate
as the BB84 protocol [18]. This result is outstanding,
as it implies that one of the signals sent in BB84 is
actually redundant [19]. In addition, our technique is:
(iii) applicable to measurement-device-independent QKD
(mdiQKD) [20]; (iv) applicable to other QKD schemes in-
cluding the six-state protocol [21]. It can be shown, for
instance, that a particular four-state scheme can post-
process its data following the specifications of the six-
state protocol [21]. That is, it can use the correlation
between phase and bit errors to increase its key rate.
(v) Our method also applies to other quantum crypto-
graphic applications (e.g., bit commitment based on the
noisy storage model [22]).
To simplify the discussion, we assume collective at-
tacks, i.e., Eve applies the same quantum operation to
each signal. However, our results also hold against co-
herent attacks by just applying either the quantum De
Finetti theorem [23] or Azuma’s inequality [24–26] (see
Appendix A for details). Moreover, for simplicity, we
consider the asymptotic scenario where Alice sends Bob
an infinite number of signals. In addition, we assume
2that there is no side-channel in the source. That is,
we consider that the single-photon components of Al-
ice’s signals are qubits, and we analyze an important
type of state preparation flaws, namely modulation errors
due to slightly over or under modulation of the signal’s
phase/polarization by an imperfect apparatus. Also, we
assume that Bob’s measurement device satisfies two con-
ditions: random basis choice and basis-independent de-
tection efficiency. The former is fulfilled if Bob selects at
random between two or more measurement settings; one
for key distillation and the others for parameter estima-
tion. The latter is satisfied if the probability of having a
detection event is independent of Bob’s measurement set-
ting choice. With mdiQKD, we can waive these two con-
ditions and allow the detection system to be untrusted.
Prepare&measure three-state protocol.—In this
scheme [16, 17], Alice sends Bob three pure states,
|φ0z〉 = |0z〉, |φ1z〉 = |1z〉 and |φ0x〉 = |0x〉, which she
selects independently at random for each signal. Here,
the states |jx〉 = [|0z〉 + (−1)j |1z〉]/
√
2, with j ∈ {0, 1}.
On Bob’s side, he measures the signals received using
either the X or the Z basis, which he selects as well
independently at random for each incoming signal. After
that, Alice and Bob announce their basis choices, and
they estimate the bit and phase error rate. We assume
that they generate a secret key only from those instances
where both of them select say the Z basis.
In the following, we present a precise phase error rate
estimation technique that uses the bases mismatch events
information. The key idea is very simple yet potentially
very useful: since any qubit state can be written in terms
of Pauli matrices, it is enough to find the transmission
rates of these operators; this will become clear below.
First, we introduce some notation.
In particular, let {Mˆ0β, Mˆ1β, Mˆf} denote the elements
of Bob’s positive-operator valued measure (POVM) as-
sociated with the basis β ∈ {X,Z}. Mˆ0β and Mˆ1β cor-
respond, respectively, to the bit values 0 and 1, and Mˆf
represents the inconclusive event. These operators do not
necessarily act on a qubit space, i.e., Eve can send Bob
any higher-dimensional state. The essential assumption
here is that Mˆf is the same for both bases [12]. Also, we
denote as Ysβ ,jα , with s, j ∈ {0, 1} and β, α ∈ {X,Z}, the
joint probability that Alice prepares the state |φjα〉 and
Bob measures it in the β basis and obtains a bit value s.
Theorem. The prepare&measure three-state protocol de-
scribed above provides a secret key rate R ∝ 1 − h(ez) −
h(ex), where h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the
binary Shannon entropy, ez is the bit error rate, and ex
is the phase error rate given by
ex =
Y0x,0z + Y0x,1z + Y1x,0x − Y0x,0x
Y0x,0z + Y0x,1z + Y1x,0z + Y1x,1z
. (1)
Notably, ex coincides with that of the BB84 protocol.
This result is remarkable because it implies that the
three-state protocol can achieve precisely the same per-
formance as the BB84 scheme, since both protocols can
obtain the exact value for the phase error rate ex together
with the bit error rate ez. That is, the additional signal
|1x〉 that is sent in BB84 seems to be unnecessary. This
means, for instance, that in those implementations of the
BB84 protocol that use four laser sources one could keep
one laser just as back-up in case one of them fails, without
any decrease in performance [27]. This also reduces the
consumption of random numbers to select the different
sources. Our security analysis differs from that provided
in Ref. [17] in that it requires less privacy amplification
(PA), and, consequently, it can deliver a higher secret
key rate. Next, we present the proof for the Theorem.
Proof. The preparation of the Z-basis states |φ0z〉 and
|φ1z〉 can be formulated in an entanglement based version
of the protocol as follows. Alice first creates a source state
|ΨZ〉AB = (|0z〉A|φ0z〉B + |1z〉A|φ1z〉B)/
√
2. Afterwards,
she measures system A in the Z basis, thereby producing
the correct signal state at site B that is sent to Bob. The
phase error rate ex is defined as the bit error rate that
Alice and Bob would observe if they measure |ΨZ〉AB in
the X basis. Importantly, if Nz denotes the number of
sifted bits in the Z basis, to distill a secure key Alice and
Bob need to sacrifice Nzh(ex) bits in the PA step.
To calculate ex, we define a virtual protocol where Al-
ice and Bob measure |ΨZ〉AB in the X basis. This state
can be equivalently written as |ΨZ〉AB = (|0x〉A|0x〉B +
|1x〉A|1x〉B)/
√
2. That is, if Alice measures system A in
the X basis and obtains the bit value j ∈ {0, 1}, she effec-
tively prepares the signal |jx〉B at site B. This means that
ex = (Y0x,1x + Y1x,0x)/(Y0x,0x + Y1x,0x + Y0x,1x + Y1x,1x).
Importantly, the probabilities Ysx,0x , with s ∈ {0, 1}, are
directly observed in the experiment because in the actual
protocol Alice sends Bob the signal |0x〉.
To obtain the terms Ysx,1x we use the fact that any
qubit state can be decomposed in terms of the iden-
tity and the three Pauli matrices. For this, we first
rewrite Ysx,1x =
1
6Tr[Dˆsx Pˆ (|1x〉)], where Pˆ (|φ〉) = |φ〉〈φ|,
Dˆsx =
∑
k Aˆ
†
kMˆsxAˆk with Aˆk being an arbitrary oper-
ator (see Appendix A), and 1/6 is the probability that
Alice emits |1x〉 and Bob chooses the X basis. Then, we
define qsx|t = Tr(Dˆsx σˆt)/2 where σˆt, with t ∈ {Id, x, z},
denotes, respectively, the identity and two of the Pauli
operators. With this notation, and using Pˆ (|1x〉) =
(1ˆ − σˆx)/2, we have that Ysx,1x = 16 (qsx|Id − qsx|x). Fi-
nally, to calculate qsx|Id and qsx|x we use the following
constraints,
Ysx,0z =
1
6
Tr
[
Dˆsx Pˆ (|φ0z〉)
]
=
1
6
(qsx|Id + qsx|z), (2)
Ysx,1z =
1
6
Tr
[
Dˆsx Pˆ (|φ1z〉)
]
=
1
6
(qsx|Id − qsx|z), (3)
Ysx,0x =
1
6
Tr
[
Dˆsx Pˆ (|φ0x〉)
]
=
1
6
(qsx|Id + qsx|x). (4)
Recall that the probabilities Ysx,0z , Ysx,1z and Ysx,0x are
directly measured in the experiment. Also, we have that
Eqs. (2)-(4) are independent, since the vectors ~Vjα :=
(1, pjαx , p
jα
y , p
jα
z ), with p
jα
w being the w (= x, y, z) com-
ponent of the Bloch vector of the state |φjα〉, are mutu-
ally linearly independent. Thus, by solving Eqs. (2)-(4)
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FIG. 1. Lower bound on the secret key rate R for different
values of the phase modulation error δ. (a) Three-state pro-
tocol with WCPs and decoy states. Here we use the phase
error rate estimation technique introduced in the paper. (b)
Decoy-state BB84 protocol based on the GLLP security argu-
ment [13]. For simulation purposes, we consider the following
experimental parameters: the dark count rate of Bob’s detec-
tors is 0.5 × 10−7, the overall transmittance of his detection
apparatus is 0.15, the loss coefficient of the channel is 0.21
dB/km, and the efficiency of the error correction protocol is
1.22. The solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond, respec-
tively, to the cases δ = 0, 0.063 and 0.126. The case δ ≥ 0.063
corresponds to an experimentally available value [29]. For
each line, we optimise the intensity of the signals to maximise
the key rate. The solid lines in both figures coincide. Im-
portantly, in (a) the three lines almost overlap, i.e., Eve can-
not enhance state preparation flaws by exploiting the channel
loss. This shows a dramatic improvement over the results il-
lustrated in (b) based on the previous technique (in GLLP).
one can obtain the exact value for qsx|t; we find that
Ysx,1x = Ysx,0z +Ysx,1z −Ysx,0x . Substituting this expres-
sion into the definition of ex we obtain Eq. (1). 
So far, for simplicity, we have considered that Alice
sends Bob single-photon states. However, our results
can be used as well when she prepares phase-randomized
weak coherent pulses (WCPs) in combination with decoy
states [28]. This is so because the decoy-state method
allows Alice and Bob to estimate the relevant probabil-
ities Ysx,0z , Ysx,1z , and Ysx,0x associated with the single-
photon signals. In addition, the analysis above can be
easily extended to include modulation errors (see Ap-
pendix B). This scenario is shown in the simulation.
Simulation.— Here we evaluate the performance of a
three-state protocol based on WCPs together with decoy
states in the presence of modulation errors. For simplic-
ity, we consider the asymptotic situation where Alice uses
an infinite number of decoy settings. Moreover, we as-
sume that she employs phase-coding, as this is usually
the preferential coding choice in optical fibre implemen-
tations. However, our analysis applies as well to other
coding schemes, e.g., polarization and time-bin coding.
More precisely, we consider that Alice sends Bob sig-
nals of the form |eiξ√α〉r|ei(ξ+θA+δθA/π)
√
α〉s, where ξ ∈
[0, 2π) is a random phase, θA ∈ {0, π/2, π} encodes Al-
ice’s information, the term δθA/π with δ ≥ 0 models an
example of phase modulation errors, and |eiξ√α〉r is a co-
herent state with mean photon number α. The subscripts
r and s are used to denote, respectively, the reference and
signal mode. In this scenario, the single-photon compo-
nents of Alice’s signals lie on a plane of the Bloch sphere.
In addition, we assume the same phase modulation error
on Bob’s side, i.e., his phase modulation is θB + δθB/π
when he chooses θB ∈ {0, π/2}. Importantly, since δ ≥ 0,
Alice’s and Bob’s modulation errors do not cancel each
other, but they only increase the total modulation error.
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate R
for different values of the error parameter δ is shown in
Fig. 1 (see Appendix C). For comparison, this figure in-
cludes as well a lower bound on R for the asymptotic
decoy-state BB84 protocol. For the latter, we use re-
sults from Ref. [14], which are based on the GLLP secu-
rity analysis [13], and we use the same phase modulation
model described above with θA ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}. As
shown in the figure, our phase error rate estimation tech-
nique can significantly outperform GLLP in the presence
of modulation errors. In particular, while GLLP delivers
a key rate that decreases rapidly when δ increases (since
it considers the worst case scenario where losses can in-
crease the fidelity flaw [14]), our method produces an
almost constant key rate independently of δ. The slight
performance decrease of the three-state protocol when δ
increases is due to the increase of the bit error rate ez
stemming from imperfect phase modulations.
Measurement-device-independent QKD.—We consider
a modified version of mdiQKD [20] where Alice and Bob
send Charles the states |φ0z〉, |φ1z〉, and |φ1x〉. Charles
is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement that
projects them into a Bell state, and then he announces
his results. Alice and Bob keep the data associated with
the successful results, post-select the events where they
employ the same basis, and say Bob applies a bit flip to
part of his data [20]. They use the Z basis (X basis) for
key distillation (parameter estimation).
In the following, we apply the phase error rate estima-
tion method introduced above to mdiQKD. Now, ex can
be expressed as
ex =
Yφ+,0x1x + Yφ+,1x0x
Yφ+,0x1x + Yφ+,1x0x + Yφ+,0x0x + Yφ+,1x1x
, (5)
where Yφ+,jxkx , with j, k ∈ {0, 1}, denotes the joint prob-
ability that Alice and Bob send Charles |jx〉 and |kx〉
respectively, and Charles declares the result |φ+〉 (al-
though he might be dishonest). This probability can be
4expressed as Yφ+,jxkx =
1
9Tr[Dˆφ+Pˆ (|jx〉)⊗ Pˆ (|kx〉)] for a
certain operator Dˆφ+ . Now, we follow the technique de-
scribed previously. We define qφ+|s,t = Tr(Dˆφ+ σˆs⊗ σˆt)/4
with s, t ∈ {Id, x, z}, and we use Pˆ (|jx〉) = [1ˆ +
(−1)j σˆx]/2 to write Yφ+,jxkx in terms of qφ+|Id,Id, qφ+|x,Id,
qφ+|Id,x, and qφ+|x,x. Finally, to calculate these coeffi-
cients we solve the following set of linear equations,
Yφ+,jzkz =
γ
9
Tr
[
Dˆφ+ Pˆ (|φjz〉)⊗ Pˆ (|φkz〉)
]
, (6)
Yφ+,0xkz =
1
9
Tr
[
Dˆφ+Pˆ (|φ0x〉)⊗ Pˆ (|φkz〉)
]
, (7)
Yφ+,jz0x =
1
9
Tr
[
Dˆφ+Pˆ (|φjz〉)⊗ Pˆ (|φ0x〉)
]
, (8)
Yφ+,0x0x =
1
9
Tr
[
Dˆφ+Pˆ (|φ0x〉)⊗ Pˆ (|φ0x〉)
]
. (9)
For simplicity, here we have omitted the explicit depen-
dence of Eqs. (6)-(9) with qφ+|s,t, and
γ
9 (0 < γ < 1)
is the probability that Alice and Bob send Charles |φjz〉
and |φkz〉 respectively, and they sacrifice such instances
as test bits. Unlike the three-state protocol introduced
above, note that now we need such test bits from the
sifted bits in the Z basis to estimate ex. Importantly,
since the set of vectors ~Vjα associated with the states
Pˆ (|φjα〉) are mutually linearly independent, Eqs. (6)-(9)
are also independent. Therefore, one can obtain the exact
value for all qφ+|s,t and, consequently, also for Yφ+,jxkx
and ex.
Like the three-state protocol, the mdiQKD scheme
above is also loss-tolerant to modulation errors. That is,
by combining our work with mdiQKD, we can simulta-
neously address flaws in state preparation and detection
systems and obtain a high secret key rate.
Discussion.— To find the phase error rate in a QKD
protocol one has to estimate the transmission rate of cer-
tain states, which might not have been sent in the actual
scheme (e.g., the signal |1x〉 in the three-state protocol),
based on the observed data. As any qubit state can be
written in terms of the identity and Pauli matrices, it is
enough to find the transmission rates of these operators.
In the three-state scheme, the states |φ0z〉 and |φ1z〉 give
the transmission rate of 1ˆ and σˆz. Thus, by sending any
other state on the X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere (e.g.,
the signal |0x〉) one can determine the transmission rate
of σˆx and, consequently, of any qubit state in that plane,
including |1x〉. In general, we have that as long as the ter-
minal points of the Bloch vectors of the three states form
a triangle it is always possible to estimate ex precisely
(see Appendix A).
Similarly, if Alice sends Bob four different qubit states,
whose vectors ~Vjα are mutually linearly independent, i.e.,
the terminal points of their Bloch vectors form a triangu-
lar pyramid, one can obtain the transmission rate of any
Pauli operator, including the identity matrix, and, there-
fore, also the exact transmission rate of any qubit state
(see Appendix A). In the original mdiQKD scheme [20]
this implies, for instance, that Alice and Bob could de-
termine the bit error rate associated to the virtual state
that they would generate when measuring the first sub-
system of |ΨZ〉 = (|0z〉|φ0z〉C + |1z〉|φ1z〉C)/
√
2 in the Y-
basis. Here C denotes the system that is sent to Charles.
As a result, they could directly use this information to
improve the achievable secret key rate. In standard pre-
pare&measure QKD protocols, however, the estimation
of the fictitious Y-basis error rate requires that Bob per-
forms a measurement in that basis (see Appendix A). In
addition, the basis-independent detection efficiency as-
sumption must hold and Bob’s POVM elements must
act on a qubit space. This is so because in order to ex-
ploit the correlation Alice and Bob need to share qubit
states [21]. Note, however, that this last requirement
could be avoided by using either the universal squash
idea [30] or the detector-decoy method [31]. That is, by
including an additional phase modulator on Bob’s side
(to perform the Y-basis measurement) one could enhance
the performance of several practical systems that gener-
ate such four states, e.g., those based on the BB84 pro-
tocol [4] or on the coherent-one-way (COW) scheme [32].
We have discussed the phase error rate estimation
problem, which affects the PA step of a QKD protocol.
To generate a secure key, however, it is also important
that the bit error rate, which affects the error-correction
step, is small enough. In this respect, our analysis sug-
gests that while it is important to have a precise state
preparation in the key generation basis, that of the other
basis is not as essential, which simplifies experimental im-
plementations. For instance, with our results, mdiQKD
only needs to align one basis well and can tolerate sub-
stantial errors in the alignment of the other bases.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our technique
requires a complete characterization of the signal states
transmitted [33]. In practice, however, it might be easier
to estimate a set of states that very likely contains the
signals prepared. In this case, one could directly apply
our method by just selecting the signal from that set that
minimizes the key rate. Importantly, our results show
that the effect of modulation errors on the performance
of practical QKD systems is almost negligible.
Conclusion.— We have introduced a phase error rate
estimation method that makes QKD loss-tolerant to state
preparation flaws. It uses information from bases mis-
match events. We have applied this technique to differ-
ent practical QKD systems and we have shown that it
can substantially improve their key generation rate and
covered distance when compared to the standard GLLP
result. Our work constitutes an important step towards
secure QKD with imperfect devices.
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Appendix A: Three-state protocol & coherent
attacks
Here we present the security proof for the three-state
protocol. We consider that Alice and Bob distill key only
from those events where both of them use the Z basis,
while the events where Bob employs the X basis are used
for parameter estimation.
As already introduced in the main text, the prepara-
tion of the Z-basis states can be equivalently described
as follows. Alice first generates |ΨZ〉AB = (|0z〉A|φ0z〉B +
|1z〉A|φ1z〉B)/
√
2, and, afterwards, she measures system
A in the Z basis. We denote this measurement as ZˆA.
Likewise, the preparation of the signal |0x〉 can also be
formulated as a two-step process, i.e., Alice first pro-
duces |ΨX〉AB = |0x〉A|φ0x〉B and then she measures sys-
tem A in the X basis. This measurement is denoted as
XˆA. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 2. This figure
contains as well Bob’s POVM Mˆx = {Mˆ0x, Mˆ1x, Mˆf},
together with his measurement outcomes. Note, how-
ever, that Fig. 2 only shows the relevant events that are
needed to estimate the phase error rate ex. An essen-
tial assumption here is that the operator Mˆf is the same
for both bases, X and Z. Conceptually, this means that
Bob could have heralded the receipt of a state from Alice
before he decides the measurement basis. This concep-
tual ability to postpone the measurement basis choice is
crucial for the security proof to go through. The mea-
surement {XˆA, Mˆx} (on the state |ΨZ〉AB) belongs to the
virtual protocol defined in the main text; it is necessary
to calculate ex.
In what follows, we consider the probability distribu-
tion for the different paths in Fig. 2. The state prepara-
tion, the measurement setting choice, and the selection
of the state that is sent can be equivalently represented
by the preparation of
|ϕ〉sh,B :=
∑
c=1,2,3,4,5
√
P (c)|c〉sh|φ(c)〉B , (A1)
followed by an orthogonal measurement using the basis
{|c〉} on the shield system sh possessed by Alice. Here,
the index c = 1, 2, . . . , 5 identifies the five possible “send-
ing states” shown in Fig. 2. That is, |φ(1)〉B := |φ0x〉B,
|φ(2)〉B := |φ1x〉B, |φ(3)〉B := |φ0z〉B, |φ(4)〉B := |φ1z〉B,
and |φ(5)〉B := |φ0x〉B.
Suppose that Alice prepares many systems of the form
given by Eq. (A1) and sends system B to Bob through
the quantum channel. Also, suppose that Alice and Bob
measure in order the shield and B systems using respec-
tively the basis {|c〉} and the POVM Mˆx, and let us con-
sider the lth run of the protocol. According to Azuma’s
State 
preparation
|B
|0 |ϕ0	
{
 , }
{ , }
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|ϕB
|ϕB
|ϕB
{0,1, F}
{0,1, F}
{0,1, F}
{0,1, F}
Bob’s 
measurement
outcome
FIG. 2. This diagram illustrates Alice’s state preparation pro-
cess together with Bob’s POVM Mˆx, the signal state sent by
Alice (denoted as “sending state”), and Bob’s measurement
outcomes. “F” represents the inconclusive event. The mea-
surement {XˆA, Mˆx} on the state |ΨZ〉AB corresponds to the
virtual protocol; the phase error rate ex is defined in terms of
its outcomes.
inequality, once we obtain the probabilities for the dif-
ferent paths of Fig. 2 in the lth run conditioned on all
previous measurement outcomes, we can determine the
actual occurrence number of the corresponding events
(see Refs. [25, 26] for a proof of this statement).
Next, we calculate these conditional probabilities. For
this, let |Φ〉sh,B = |ϕl−1〉sh,B|ϕl〉sh,B|ϕr〉sh,B denote the
state prepared by Alice in an execution of the protocol.
Here, |ϕl−1〉sh,B, |ϕl〉sh,B, and |ϕr〉sh,B represent, respec-
tively, Alice’s signals in the first l−1 runs, in the lth run,
and in the rest of runs.
This state evolves according to Eve’s unitary transfor-
mation, VˆBE, on Bob’s system B and on her system E as
follows,
VˆBE|Φ〉sh,B|0〉E =
∑
k
Bˆk,B|Φ〉sh,B|k〉E, (A2)
where Bˆk,B is a Kraus operator acting on system B. Im-
portantly, VˆBE and Bˆk,B are independent of the state
preparation process. This is so because the classical com-
munication between Alice and Bob is done after finishing
the measurements. Let the joint operator
Oˆl−1,sh,B = ⊗l−1u=1Mˆshu,su , (A3)
where Mˆshu,su denotes the Kraus operator associated to
the uth measurement outcome of the shield system sh
and Bob’s uth measurement outcome. The joint state
in the lth run of the protocol, ρˆsh,Bl|Ol−1 , conditioned on
the measurement outcomes Ol−1 of the first l − 1 joint
6systems can then be written as
ρˆsh,Bl|Ol−1 = σˆ
sh,B
l|Ol−1
/p(l) , (A4)
σˆsh,Bl|Ol−1 :=
∑
k
Trl
[
Pˆ
(
Oˆl−1,sh,BBˆk,B|Φ〉sh,B
)]
,
p(l) := Tr
(
σˆsh,Bl|Ol−1
)
,
where Trl represents the partial trace over all systems
except the lth sh and B systems. Equivalently, σˆsh,Bl|Ol−1
can be rewritten as
σˆsh,Bl|Ol−1 =
∑
k
∑
~xl−1,~xr
Pˆ
(
Aˆ
(~xl−1,~xr)
k,B|Ol−1
|ϕl〉sh,B
)
=
∑
k
∑
~xl−1,~xr
Pˆ
(∑
c
√
P (c)|c〉shAˆ(~xl−1,~xr)k,B|Ol−1 |φ(c)〉B
)
,(A5)
where
Aˆ
(~xl−1,~xr)
k,B|Ol−1
:= 〈~xr |〈~xl−1|Oˆl−1,sh,BBˆk,B|ϕl−1〉sh,B|ϕr〉sh,B.
Here {〈~xr|} ({〈~xl−1|}) is bases for all the remaining sys-
tems after the lth run (for the first l − 1 joint systems).
Importantly, Eq. (A5) states that the lth joint system
is subjected to Eve’s action and her action depends on
all the previous measurement outcomes on the first l− 1
joint systems.
Now, to determine the probability distribution for the
different paths in Fig. 2, we measure the shield system
sh using the basis {|c〉} and Bob’s system using the X
basis. The probability of obtaining c and the bit value
sx conditioned on Ol−1 is given by
Ysx,c|Ol−1 =
P (c)
p(l)
∑
k
∑
~xl−1,~xr
Tr[Pˆ (Aˆ
(~xl−1,~xr)
k,B|Ol−1
|φ(c)〉B)Mˆsx ]
:=
P (c)
p(l)
Tr[Dˆsx|Ol−1Pˆ (|φ(c)〉B)], (A6)
where
Dˆsx|Ol−1 =
∑
k
∑
~xl−1,~xr
Aˆ
†(~xl−1,~xr)
k,B|Ol−1
MˆsxAˆ
(~xl−1,~xr)
k,B|Ol−1
.
Note that the discussions in the main text use the prob-
ability P (c) given in Eq. (A6) but do not employ the
explicit form of Dˆsx . Therefore, the relationships such as
Ysx,1x = Ysx,0z +Ysx,1z −Ysx,0x that are considered in the
main text can be interpreted as the linear relationships
between the lth conditional probabilities Ysx,c|Ol−1 . This
is so because the normalization factor p(l) does not affect
this interrelation. Thus, by taking the summation of such
probabilities over l, Azuma’s inequality [25, 26] gives the
actual occurrence number of such events and the phase
error rate in the virtual protocol can be estimated. This
concludes the proof.
Appendix B: Imperfect state preparation
In this section we apply our phase error rate estima-
tion technique to both a tilted four-state protocol, which
is a variant of the BB84 scheme, and the three-state pro-
tocol with modulation errors. For the former, we assume
that the terminal points of the four Bloch vectors associ-
ated with the four states sent by Alice form a triangular
pyramid.
1. A tilted four-state protocol
Here we show that is possible to obtain the precise
detection rate of any state. Suppose that Alice sends
Bob four states given by
ρˆjα =
1
2
(
1ˆ +
∑
t=x,y,z
pjαt σˆt
)
, (B1)
where j ∈ {0, 1} and α ∈ {X,Z}. Moreover, let us assume
that the vectors ~Vjα, with ~Vjα = (1, p
jα
x , p
jα
y , p
jα
z ), are
mutually linearly independent. From the viewpoint of
the Bloch sphere, this means that the terminal points
of the four Bloch vectors associated with the four states
form a triangular pyramid. Suppose also that Alice and
Bob distill key from the Z basis and use the events where
Bob employs the X basis for parameter estimation. In
this scenario, let |φjz〉Ae,B denote a purification of ρˆjz,
with Ae and B representing, respectively, Alice’s shield
system and the system that is sent to Bob. With this
notation, Alice’s state preparation process in the Z basis
can be described by using any of the following two source
states,
|ΨZ〉A,Ae,B =
1√
2
∑
j=0,1
|jz〉A|φjz〉Ae,B, (B2)
|ΨZ〉A,Ae,B =
1√
2
∑
j=0,1
|jz〉A|φ(j⊕1)z〉Ae,B, (B3)
where A is a virtual qubit system of Alice and the sym-
bol ⊕ denotes the modulo-2 addition. If Alice measures
system A in the Z basis she prepares the desire state at
site B, while she keeps the shield system Ae. Here, the
difference between Eqs. (B2) and (B3) is just a bit-flip.
Since a bit-flip is a symmetry in the problem, Alice is al-
lowed to choose any of the two equations above [Eqs. (B2)
and (B3)] in constructing the purifications with the goal
of optimising the key generation rate.
To calculate the phase error rate ex we consider the
virtual protocol where Alice and Bob measure |ΨZ〉A,Ae,B
in the X basis. In this virtual protocol, Alice emits
σˆB;jx,Vir = TrA,Ae
[
Pˆ (|jx〉A)⊗ 1ˆAe,BPˆ
(
|ΨZ〉A,Ae,B
)]
.
We denote these signals σˆB;jx,Vir as virtual states,
and we define the normalised state ˆ˜σB;jx,Vir =
7σˆB;jx,Vir/Tr (σˆB;jx,Vir). Then, the joint probability that
Alice sends |jx〉 and Bob detects the bit value sx is given
by Ysx,jx = P (jx)Tr(Dˆsx ˆ˜σB;jx,Vir). Note that the value
of P (jα), which is defined in the same way as P (c) in the
previous section, is known from the protocol as well as
Eqs. (B2) and (B3). The phase error rate ex is given by
ex =
Y0x,1x + Y1x,0x
Y0x,0x + Y1x,0x + Y0x,1x + Y1x,1x
. (B4)
Now, since ˆ˜σB;jx,Vir can also be written as
ˆ˜σB;jx,Vir =
1
2
(
1ˆ +
∑
t=x,y,z
pjx,Virt σˆt
)
, (B5)
to obtain Ysx,jx (and thus ex) it is enough to calculate
qsx|t = Tr(Dˆsx σˆt)/2 with t ∈ {Id, x, y, z}. For this, note
that in the actual experiment we have the following con-
straints,
Ysx,jα = P (jα)Tr
(
Dˆsx ρˆjα
)
= P (jα)
(
qsx|Id + p
jα
x qsx|x + p
jα
y qsx|y + p
jα
z qsx|z
)
.
(B6)
Then, as long as the vectors ~Vjα are mutually linearly in-
dependent, we can solve the set of linear equations given
by Eq. (B6) and obtain qsx|Id, qsx|x, qsx|y, and qsx|z. That
is, we can determine the exact transmission rate of any
state, including the signal σˆB;jx,Vir, which gives the phase
error rate.
Moreover, if Bob’s POVM elements act on a qubit
space and he performs a measurement in the Y-basis,
Alice and Bob can also estimate the Y-basis error rate.
To see this, note that one only needs to change in the dis-
cussion above the terms sx with sy and define the Y-basis
virtual state as
σˆB;jy,Vir = TrA,Ae
[
Pˆ
(|jy〉A)⊗ 1ˆAe,BPˆ (|ΨZ〉A,Ae,B
)]
.
2. Three-state protocol
The technique described above can also be applied to
the three-state protocol with modulation errors.
In particular, suppose that the corresponding vectors
~Vjα are mutually linearly independent and, moreover, the
actual three states lie on the X-Z plane of the Bloch
sphere. In this situation, we can consider the purifica-
tions given by Eq. (B2) or Eq. (B3) such that the coeffi-
cient pjx,Viry = 0 in Eq. (B5). That is, all the coefficients
of the purifications can be chosen to be real numbers in
the X and Z bases. Now, since all the states, including
the actual states and the virtual states, lie on the X-Z
plane, we can obtain the transmission rate of the virtual
states (and, consequently, the phase error rate ex) by just
using the same arguments provided in the main text.
This also implies that sending any three states, which
do not necessarily lie on the X-Z plane, is enough to
perform secure key distribution as long as the corre-
sponding three vectors ~Vjα are mutually linearly inde-
pendent. That is, the terminal points of the Bloch
vectors associated with the three states form a trian-
gle. This is so because all the states on the X-Z plane
can be uniformly “lifted up” by a filtering operation
q|0y〉〈0y| + (1 − q)|1y〉〈1y| with 0 ≤ q < 1. That is, the
virtual states can always be chosen on the same plane
spanned by the three actual states. Thus, by using the
transmission rate of the actual states, one can obtain the
transmission rate of the virtual states and, therefore, also
the phase error rate.
Appendix C: Simulation for the three-state protocol
In this section we present the calculations used to
obtain Fig. 1 (a) in the main text. We begin with
the single-photon components of the signals sent by
Alice. In particular, we have that the single pho-
ton part of |eiξ√α〉r|ei(ξ+θA+δθA/π)
√
α〉s is given by
(|1〉r|0〉s + ei(θA+δθA/π)|0〉r|1〉s)/
√
2, where 0 and 1 rep-
resent, respectively, the photon number. The set
{|1〉r|0〉s, |0〉r|1〉s} forms a qubit basis. Therefore, we
can choose the Z basis such that Alice’s Z-basis states
are expressed as
|φ0z〉 = |0z〉,
|φ1z〉 = sin δ
2
|0z〉+ cos δ
2
|1z〉, (C1)
where |0y〉 := |1〉r|0〉s and |1y〉 := |0〉r|1〉s with |0z〉 :=
(|0y〉+ |1y〉)/
√
2 and |1z〉 := (−i|0y〉+ i|1y〉)/
√
2.
In the virtual protocol, Alice generates the state
(|0z〉A|φ0z〉B + |1z〉A|φ1z〉B)/
√
2 and sends system B to
Bob. This joint state can be equivalently expressed as√
1 + sin
δ
2
|0x〉A|φ′0x〉B +
√
1− sin δ
2
|1x〉A|φ′1x〉B, (C2)
where the signals |φ′0x〉B and |φ′1x〉B have the form
|φ′0x〉B := C0,0(δ)|0x〉B + C1,0(δ)|1x〉B (C3)
|φ′1x〉B := C0,1(δ)|0x〉B + C1,1(δ)|1x〉B, (C4)
and the coefficients Ci,j(δ) are given by
C0,0(δ) =
1 + sin δ2 + cos
δ
2
2
√
1 + sin δ2
, C1,0(δ) =
1 + sin δ2 − cos δ2
2
√
1 + sin δ2
,
C0,1(δ) =
1− sin δ2 − cos δ2
2
√
1− sin δ2
, C1,1(δ) =
1− sin δ2 + cos δ2
2
√
1− sin δ2
.
As already explained in the main text, our phase error
rate estimation technique provides the exact value for the
transmission rates Ysx,jx . Therefore, we can obtain the
precise transmission rate of the signals |φ′jx〉B.
8For our simulations, we consider a channel model
where the conditional probabilities Ysx|jx (i.e., the con-
ditional probability that Bob obtains sx given that Alice
sent him the state |jx〉) are given by
Ysx|jx = (1 − L)Cs,j(3δ/2)2(1− ed/2) + ed(1− ed/2)
+ (1 − L)Cs⊕1,j(3δ/2)2ed, (C5)
where ed is the dark count rate of Bob’s detectors, and
L denotes the total loss rate. Here, we have considered
the transformation δ → 3δ/2 because Bob applies a phase
modulation to the incoming signals. In Eq. (C5), the first
(second) term models a single detection click at Bob’s
side produced by a photon (dark count), while the last
term represents simultaneous clicks. Note that in this
last case (simultaneous clicks), Bob assigns a random bit
value to the measurement result.
For convenience, here we will write the phase error rate
ex in terms of the conditional probabilities Ysx|jx . Note
that we can do so because the choice of the state and the
measurement is random and uniform. We have that the
phase error rate e
(1)
x of the single-photon components,
and the single-photon gain Q
(1)
z are given by
e(1)x =
Y1x|0x + Y0x|1x
Y1x|0x + Y0x|1x + Y1x|1x + Y0x|0x
, (C6)
Q(1)z =
1
2
e−2αα
∑
j,s
Ysx|jxP (jx), (C7)
where P (jx) = [1 + (−1)j sin (δ/2)]/2.
Similarly, one can obtain the overall gain Qz and the
bit error rate ez in the Z basis. These parameters have
the form
ez = wz/Qz , (C8)
Qz =
1
2
[
P0|0(1 − P1|0) + (1− P0|0)P1|0 + P0|0P1|0
]
+
1
2
[
P0|1(1 − P1|1) + (1− P0|1)P1|1 + P0|1P1|1
]
,
(C9)
wz =
1
2
[
P0|0(1 − P1|0) + (1− P0|0)P1|0 + P0|0P1|0
]
,
(C10)
where Ps|j is the conditional probability that Bob obtains
a bit value s given that Alice sent him a bit value j. These
probabilities can be written as
P0|0 = ed + (1− ed)
[
1− e−α(1−L)
]
, (C11)
P1|0 = ed, (C12)
P0|1 = ed + (1− ed)
[
1− e−α(1−L) sin2 (δ/2)
]
, (C13)
P1|1 = ed + (1− ed)
[
1− e−α(1−L) cos2 (δ/2)
]
. (C14)
Finally, the asymptotic key generation rate is given by
R =
1
2
{
Q(1)z [1− h(ex)]−Qzh(ez)
}
, (C15)
where h(x) is the binary entropy function. For each value
of the distance, we optimise the parameter α to maximise
the key rate. The result is shown in Fig. 1 (a) in the main
text.
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